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In this paper I develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in
which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. I characterize
the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations, and show that,
under this contract, the agent’s utility converges to its lower bound–immiseration occurs. I also
show that, unlike in environments with i.i.d. shocks, the principal would like to renegotiate with
the agent when the agent’s productivity is low–it is not renegotiation-proof. I apply the theoretical
methods I have developed and numerically solve this (Mirrleesian) dynamic taxation model. I ﬁnd
that it is optimal to allow a wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and individuals’
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. This wedge is signiﬁcantly higher
than what is found in the i.i.d. case. Thus, using the i.i.d. assumption is not a good approximation
quantitatively when there is persistence in productivity shocks.
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A common assumption in the dynamic mechanism design literature is that the agent's
privately observed shocks are i.i.d. As pointed out by Fernandes and Phelan[7], this as-
sumption is merely for the sake of tractability. It implies that, at the beginning of a given
date, an agent's forward looking utility of following a given strategy when facing a given
contract is independent of past histories1.
However, in a lot of economic environments with hidden information, the agent's shocks
are highly persistent. For example, in (Mirrleesian)dynamic optimal taxation with hidden
productivities shocks, Kocherlakota[12] comments:
(The i.i.d. assumption is not)... particularly good approximation to what
we know about individual skills from the empirical literature on individual
wages. This literature documents that individuals experience large and persis-
tent shocks to their wages(and presumably to their skills as well) throughout
their lives(see Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron[15] and Meghir and Pistaferri[10]).
In the design of optimal health insurance, it is well known that a customer's health con-
dition today is strongly correlated with her previous conditions. And in unemployment
insurance where an unemployed worker's searching e®ort is hidden, it is typical that the
worker's chance of ¯nding a new job depends not only on her current e®ort, but also on
her searching e®ort in the past.
Fernandes and Phelan[7] developed a recursive formulation of the contracting problem
in which private types are serially correlated. In these situations, di®erent types of agents
derive di®erent continuation utilities from the same continuation contract. When the agent
1Fernandes and Phelan called this property common knowledge of preferences over continuation con-
tracts.
1chooses between truth-telling and lying, she compares the continuation utility as a truth-
teller and the continuation utility as a liar. Thus it is necessary for the principal to enforce
a vector of utilities for all the potentially di®erent types. They showed that this vector of
continuation utilities is the state variable in their recursive formulation.
This paper is based on Fernandes and Phelan's recursive formulation. Di®erent from
Fernandes and Phelan, who solved the optimal contract by numerical iteration following
the idea of Abreu, Pearce and Staccheti[1], I use continuous-time methods and characterize
the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary di®erential equations. The
advantage of the continuous-time method is twofold. First, it simpli¯es the mechanism
design problem and thus allows us to discover new qualitative properties of the optimal
contract. For example, I ¯nd that the cost of delivering a utility vector is increasing in
the promised utility but decreasing in the threat utility. The contract is not renegotiation-
proof when the agent reports to be the low-productivity type. I am also able to show that
asymptotically the agent's utility converges to its lower-bound almost surely. Neither of
these properties can be easily derived from a numerical iteration. Second, the ordinary
di®erential equations allow di®erent numerical methods which are faster and more accurate
than the commonly used iteration methods. Thus the continuous-time methods provide a
new approach to the mechanism design problem both qualitatively and numerically.
Our method of solving dynamic contract has immediate applications in numerous eco-
nomic problems with hidden information. Besides the benchmark model with taxation, I
give two more examples here. In health insurance, a typical situation between an insur-
ance company and a customer is that the customer's privately observed health condition is
varying but persistent over time. For simplicity, let us assume that her condition µt at time
t can be either serious(µt = µH), or non-serious(µt = µL < µH). Let her consumption of
medicare be ct and her instantaneous utility function be µtu(ct), implying that she desires
more medicare while condition being serious than non-serious. The design of the optimal
2consumption plan2 C = fctg1
















where ¹ U is the outside option that the customer has.
In executive compensation, it is often argued that the manager knows more about
the pro¯tability of the ¯rm than shareholders. Let µt be the pro¯t of the ¯rm that is only
observable to the manager and let dt be the dividend payment. I assume that the managers
can consume the rest of the pro¯t not taken by the shareholders. Then the e±cient design
of contract D = fdtg1
t=0 would be to maximize the dividend payment given the promised
















If the utility function u(c) takes the form of ¡e¡¾c, the problem can be transformed into
the previous model with taste shocks.
This paper is motivated by Sannikov[13, 14], who recently introduced a new continuous-
time framework to study dynamic models with hidden actions. In his environments with
imperfect monitoring, the public signal is a Brownian Motion with a drift term driven
by the agent's actions. Using continuous-time methods, he characterized the equilibrium
set([13]) and the optimal contract([14]) both by di®erential equations. This paper has
the same spirit as his in the sense that we provide similar characterizations of the opti-
mal contract. One thing that is di®erent between his methods and mine is that we use
2See Section 2 for a detailed description of the contracting problem.
3di®erent stochastic processes in the construction of the model. He uses drifted Brown-
ian motion(with continuous sample paths) while I choose a jumping process.3 This seemly
technical consideration actually explains the drastic di®erence between the two continuous-
time methods.
Kapicka[11] also attacked the optimal taxation problem with persistent shocks by using
a ¯rst-order approach. He studied an environment in which the agent can potentially have
a continuum of types and claimed that the state variable of the original problem can be
simpli¯ed into two numbers. However, his paper did not show the equivalence between the
original problem and the simpli¯ed one, thus it is hard to tell, among his characterizations
of the simpli¯ed problem, which can carry over to the true problem, and which can not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic envi-
ronment and sets up the social planner's contracting problem. In section 3, I derive the
continuous-time law of motion of the state variable as one di®erential equation for the
promised utility and one di®erential inequality for the threat utility. The resulting di®er-
ential equations are put to use in Section 4 to characterize the set of implementable utility
pairs and in Section 5 to study the long-run dynamics of the optimal contract. Here I show
that the agents utility converges to its lower bound almost surely. In Section 6, through a
numerical example, I show that models with persistent shocks implies signi¯cantly higher
wedges than the models with i.i.d. shocks. The last section contains concluding comments.
All proofs omitted in the main text are in the Appendix.
3Sannikov's framework can not be readily adopted to study hidden information models, because Brown-
ian motion(or more generally di®usion process) has a continuum of states, making the state variable in
Fernandes and Phelan's recursive formulation too large to handle.
42. A Dynamic Taxation Problem
I shall consider an environment similar to that in Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski
[8] with privately observed productivity shocks. Time is continuous and t 2 [0;1). At
time 0, a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent can enter into binding contracts(put
it di®erently, they can commit). The principal is able to borrow or lend from the outside at
a constant interest rate r. Thus given a utility level she promises to the agent, her objective
is to design a contract that minimizes the expected cost of the consumption-output plan





¡rt [u(ct) ¡ µtv(yt)]dt
¸
; (1)
where ct and yt are the agent's consumption and output at time t, and E is the expectation
operator. I assume that the instantaneous utility function u has bounded domain [0;¹ c]4.
In (0;¹ c), u is twice continuously di®erentiable, u0 is positive, u00 is negative and u(0) = 0,
limc!0 u0(c) = 1, limc!¹ c u0(c) = 0. Disutility function v has bounded domain [0; ¹ y]. v0;v00
are both positive and v(0) = 0, limy!0 v0(y) = 0, limy!¹ y v0(y) = 1. For convenience, I use
¹ u; ¹ v to denote u(¹ c);v(¹ y), respectively.
The agent's privately observed µt is her taste shock. It can be re-interpreted as pro-
ductivity shock if v(y) = y°;° > 1. In this case µv(y) = v(l), where l = y=Á;Á = µ¡1=°,
the agent is able to transform 1 unit of labor into Á units of output and her disutility
depends on the amount of labor l she spends to produce y. To keep matters simple, I
shall consider the case where µt may assume only two values, µL;µH with µH > µL > 0.
Formally, fµtg1
t=0 2 fµL;µHg is a two-state continuous-time Markov process that spends
an exponential time with rate ¸ in one state before going to the other. Notice that in
4The purpose of this assumption is to make the range of utility function a compact set, which helps to
generate a compact set of promised values. Having a merely bounded utility function without bounded
domain can not guarantee the compactness of the set.
5my formulation, the H type agent has lower productivity, in the sense that her marginal
disutility is higher than that of the L type when producing the same amount of output.
I assume that initially the agent knows her type, while the principal holds a priori belief
(pL;1 ¡ pL), with pL being the probability of L type. At time 0, the principal o®ers a
contract, which the agent may accept or reject. If the agent accepts, she sequentially
reports the newly-observed shocks to the principal, and the principal implements the con-
tract based on the reported history. Before I go into the details of the agent's strategy
space and the planner's contracting problem, it would be crucial to ¯rst understand the
sequence of actions after the agent accepts the contract. I adopt an approach commonly
used in game theory, that is, I ¯rst describe a discrete-time analogue of the model, and
then think of my continuous-time model as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time models
when I let the length of each period converge to 0.
Let dt > 0 be the length of one period. Period n represents the time interval [ndt;(n+
1)dt). Productivity shocks, reports and consumption-output decisions all happen at the
beginning of each period. That is, at t = ndt, after the agent observes her new type, she
immediately reports it to the principal and based on the history of report, the principal
implements consumption-output plan (ct;yt). For the rest of the period, (µt;ct;yt) remain
unchanged, and the agent and the principal wait for the beginning of the next period.
To be consistent with the continuous-time Markov process, I also require Pr(µndt+dt =
µjjµndt = µi) = ¸dt, for i 6= j.
Now I continue the discussion of the continuous-time contracting problem. I use the
following notation. I denote the set of all possible histories up to time t(but not including
t) by £t¡, and the set of all possible histories up to and including t by £t.
£
t¡ = ff : f is a right continuous function [0;t) 7! fL;Hg; and has ¯nite jumps.g
£
t = ff : f is a right continuous function [0;t] 7! fL;Hg; and has ¯nite jumps.g
6I use µt¡ and ht¡ to denote generic elements of £t¡ and µt;ht to denote those of £t. A
strategy for the principal is to o®er a contract C = fct;ytg1
t=0 at time 0, where ct : £t 7!
[0;¹ c] speci¯es the consumption, and yt : £t 7! [0; ¹ y] speci¯es the output at t after the
agent's report. A strategy for the agent is a collection of functions ¾ = f¾tg1
t=0 , where
each ¾t : £t¡ £ fL;Hg 7! fL;Hg maps a history of shocks before t together with the
newly observed shock at the beginning of t into a report. Given a type realization µt 2 £t,
¾t(µt) = f¾s(µs)gt
s=0 is the reported history under strategy ¾ up to t. A strategy ¾ is
truth-telling if for all t and µt¡ 2 £t¡, ¾t(µt¡;L) = L and ¾t(µt¡;H) = H. With a bit of
abuse of notation, I use µ to denote the truth-telling strategy.
Given a contract C, the agent with initial type i(i = L;H) receives ex-ante utility















A contract C is said to be incentive-compatible(I.C.) if
wi(µ;C) = max
¾
wi(¾;C); for i = L;H:
In our environment with commitment, the revelation principle is applicable. There-
fore we restrict attention to I.C. contracts. Notice that the optimal contract minimizes
the principal's expected cost, thus optimality implicitly depends on the principal's belief



























s:t: wL(µ;C) = max
¾
wL(¾;C) ¸ ¹ UL;
wH(µ;C) = max
¾
wH(¾;C) ¸ ¹ UH:
7The above problem can be easily solved once we know the solutions for special cases
where pL = 0 or 1. This can be seen as follows. For (wL;wH), let VL(wL;wH) be the cost














s:t: wL = wL(µ;C) = max
¾
wL(¾;C);
wH = wH(µ;C) = max
¾
wH(¾;C):







H) + (1 ¡ pL)VH(w
0
L;wH)
s:t: wL ¸ w
0
L;wL ¸ ¹ UL;
wH ¸ w
0
H;wH ¸ ¹ UH:
In the rest of the paper, I shall focus on the optimal contract when the principal holds the
belief of either 0 or 1.
3. Incentive Constraints and Law of Motion of (wL;wH)
Given a contract C and a report ht¡ 2 £t¡, let (wL(h;t);wH(h;t)) be the continuation
utility of the agent with newly observed type L and H respectively, before the agent makes
the report at time t. Because the utility pair (wL(h;t);wH(h;t)) serves as the state variable
in a recursive formulation, I derive the law of motion of the state variable in this section.
Let wi(h;t;j) be the continuation utility of the type i agent, after she makes a type
j report at time t. For example, wL(h;t;H) is the utility of the agent after she observes
that her true type is L, and cheats the principal. For s > t, (h;t;j;s) denotes the history
in which the report is h¡t before t and j from t to s(but not including s). wi(h;t;j;s)
8denotes the continuation utility of the type i agent at time s, before she makes the report,
and given that her reported history before s is (h;t;j;s). Obviously,
wL(h;t) = maxfwL(h;t;L);wL(h;t;H)g;wH(h;t) = maxfwH(h;t;L);wH(h;t;H)g:
Right continuity of the report implies that, after the report at t, the agent needs to wait a
small but positive amount of time before she reports a switch in her type, and this implies
wi(h;t;j) = lim
s#t
wi(h;t;j;s);i = L;H;j = L;H: (2)
Theorem 1 Let C be a contract and (wL;wH) be an arbitrary stochastic process. C is
I.C. and (wL(h;t);wH(h;t)) is the promised utility pair under C if and only if the following
statements hold.
(1) There is a uniform bound B > 0, such that for any time t and history ht¡,
¡B · wi(h;t) · B;i = L;H: (3)















= (¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸wH(h;t;L) ¡





· (¸ + r)wH(h;t;L) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡





· (¸ + r)wL(h;t;H) ¡ ¸wH(h;t) ¡





= (¸ + r)wH(h;t) ¡ ¸wL(h;t;H) ¡
u(ct(h;t;H)) + µHv(yt(h;t;H)): (9)
9Proof. (Necessity.) If C is I.C., truth-telling is an optimal strategy. I obtain
wL(h;t) = wL(h;t;L) ¸ wL(h;t;H);
wH(h;t) = wH(h;t;H) ¸ wH(h;t;L):
Together with equation (2), I obtain equations (4),(5). Next I will prove equations (6),(7).
The proofs for equations (8),(9) are analogous and thus omitted.
For s > t, I discretize the time interval [t;s) into [t;t+dt);[t+dt;t+2dt):::, where dt
is a small number. Recall that µ remains constant in each subinterval and
Pr(µt+dt = µLjµt = µL) = 1 ¡ ¸dt
Pr(µt+dt = µHjµt = µL) = ¸dt:
I have
wL(h;t) = [u(ct(h;t;L)) ¡ µLv(yt(h;t;L))]dt + e
¡rdt[
(1 ¡ ¸dt)wL(h;t;L;t + dt) + ¸dtwH(h;t;L;t + dt)]
= wL(h;t;L;t + dt) + [u(ct(h;t;L)) ¡ µLv(yt(h;t;L)) +
¸wH(h;t;L;t + dt) ¡ (¸ + r)wL(h;t;L;t + dt)]dt:
Notice that in the second equality, I ignore all the terms with order two or above. Taking
limit in the above yields
lim
dt!0




((¸ + r)wL(h;t;L;t + dt) ¡ ¸wH(h;t;L;t + dt) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µLv(yt(h;t;L)))
= (¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸wH(h;t;L) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µLv(yt(h;t;L)):
Last I prove equation (7). Since under C, the H type agent can not obtain higher utility
10than wH(h;t) by pretending to be L type for period [t;t + dt),
wH(h;t) ¸ [u(ct(h;t;L)) ¡ µHv(yt(h;t;L))]dt + e
¡rdt[
(1 ¡ ¸dt)wH(h;t;L;t + dt) + ¸dtwL(h;t;L;t + dt)]
= wH(h;t;L;t + dt) + [u(ct(h;t;L)) ¡ µHv(yt(h;t;L)) +








((¸ + r)wH(h;t;L;t + dt) ¡ ¸wL(h;t;L;t + dt) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µHv(yt(h;t;L)))
= (¸ + r)wH(h;t;L) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µHv(yt(h;t;L)):
(Su±ciency.) I verify two things. First truth-telling obtains the promised utility
(wL(h;t);wH(h;t)). Second, truth-telling is optimal. From equation (6), I have
wL(h;t) = (u(ct) ¡ µLv(yt))dt + e
¡rdt [(1 ¡ ¸dt)wL(h;t;L;t + dt) + ¸dtwH(h;t;L;t + dt)]:
This implies that truth-telling delivers wL(h;t) at time t as long as it delivers utilities









where ht+(n+1)dt denotes a possible history up to t + (n + 1)dt, with the history before t
identical to ht and Et denotes the conditional expectation based on the history ht. Since







11The utility wL(h;t) is delivered under the truth-telling strategy.
Cheating can not obtain a utility higher than wL(h;t). This can be seen from the
following. From equation (8),
wL(h;t) ¸ wL(h;t;H;t + dt) + [u(ct(h;t;H)) ¡ µLv(yt(h;t;H)) +
¸wH(h;t;H;t + dt) ¡ (¸ + r)wL(h;t;H;t + dt)]dt
= [u(ct(h;t;H)) ¡ µLv(yt(h;t;H))]dt + e
¡rdt[
(1 ¡ ¸dt)wL(h;t;H;t + dt) + ¸dtwH(h;t;H;t + dt)]
= wL(h;t;H):
An analogous argument shows wH(h;t) ¸ wH(h;t;L). Therefore, (wL(h;t);wH(h;t)) is
the promised utility pair under C and C is I.C.
Remark 1 If we think of wL(h;t;L;s) as a function of s, then it is a continuous function,
while wH(h;t;L;s) may be a discontinuous function with downward jumps. The number of
jumps is at most countable.












· (¸ + r)wH(h;t) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡
u(ct(h;t;L)) + µHv(yt(h;t;L)):
And given that jumping points are countable, the above equations hold almost everywhere.
Remark 3 Given that the precise meanings of the symbols are understood, I rewrite the
conditions in Theorem 1 in a more concise and intuitive way. There are three stages in
12the report, the stage when the agent reports to be L, the stage to be H and the time point
when a switch occurs. Conditions in (4 ¡ 9) are equivalent to:
There is a non-negative stochastic process ¹, such that, if the report is L,
dwL
dt
= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt);
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt) ¡ ¹t:
If the report is H,
dwL
dt
= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt) ¡ ¹t;
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt):














We interpret possible jumps in the di®erential inequality as ¹t = 1.
4. The Set of Implementable Utilities
Before we try to ¯nd the optimal contract to implement any particular utility pair, it
will be helpful to consider the set of all utility pairs that are implementable by at least
one contract. Conceptually we could obtain the set by the following procedure. Pick any
13I.C. contract and calculate two types' utilities under the truth-telling strategy. This will
generate a point for us. Then move to another contract, and obtain a di®erent point.
After we go over all possible I.C. contracts and collect all points, we get the set. This set is
similar to the set of equilibrium payo®s in the context of repeated games. For any vector
in the set, there is an equilibrium strategy to achieve it, while any vector not in the set
can not be achieved. Formally, de¯ne
W = f(wL(µ;C);wH(µ;C)) : C is I.C. g:
The common approach in the literature is to compute this set by iteration. Following
the idea of Abreu, Pearce and Staccheti[1], we may start with an initial guess which contains
W. We then iterate until the sequence of sets converges to W, which is the largest ¯xed
point of the operator. However, using continuous-time methods, I shall show that this set
can be obtained directly. In fact the boundary of W can be characterized by di®erential
equations. The rest of this section will be devoted to this characterization.
I ¯rst study some simple contracts. If the contract always speci¯es maximal consump-
tion ¹ c and minimal output 0, regardless of reports(i.e. ct(ht) = ¹ c;yt(ht) = 0;8ht 2 £t),
then the contract can implement the pair (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r), which is the upper-right corner of
W. If consumption 0 and output ¹ y are always speci¯ed , the lower-left corner is imple-
mented. I denote it by (xL;xH), where xL = ¡¹ v((¸ + r)µL + ¸µH)=(r(2¸ + r));xH =
¡¹ v((¸ + r)µH + ¸µL)=(r(2¸ + r)). It is easy to see that the \consumption 0, output 0"
contract implements the utility pair (0;0), while the \consumption ¹ c, output ¹ y" contract
implements (xL + ¹ u=r;xH + ¹ u=r).
Next I look at four families of contracts. The ¯rst two families are indexed by c¤ 2 (0;¹ c).















¤ 2 (0;¹ c): (10)















¤ 2 (0;¹ c): (11)
The third and fourth families of contracts are indexed by t¤ 2 (0;1). Any contract C 3t¤












(0; ¹ y);t > t¤;











(¹ c; ¹ y);t · t¤
(¹ c;0);t > t¤:
The utility pair (w3t¤
L ;w3t¤
H ) implemented by C 3t¤ can be solved in the following way. Under




= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL;
and (wL;wH) will hit (xL;xH) at time t¤. Therefore I solve the di®erential equations
together with the boundary condition and obtain
w
3t¤











































+ xL + ¹ u=r; (14)
w
4t¤












+ xH + ¹ u=r: (15)
It turns out that the utility pairs delivered by (C 1c¤;C 2c¤;C 3t¤;C 4t¤) form the boundary
of W(see Figure 1).


















(xL + ¯ u/r,xH + ¯ u/r)
(¯ u/r, ¯ u/r)
Figure 1: Set of implementable utility pairs.
Theorem 2 The boundaries of W consist of four vertices ((¹ u=r; ¹ u=r), (xL;xH), (0;0),
(xL + ¹ u=r;xH + ¹ u=r)) and four pieces of curves that connect these vertices. The upper
boundary is speci¯ed in (10,12,13), while the lower boundary is speci¯ed in (11,14,15).
16Proof. I verify two things. First any point between the two boundaries can be imple-
mented by some contract. Second, any point either above the upper boundary or below
the lower boundary can not be implemented by any contract.
From the above argument, any point on the upper or lower boundary can be imple-
mented by de¯nition. To implement a point (wL;wH) between the two boundaries, the
principal may start with the policy (ct;yt) = (0;0) and let the promised utilities evolve
according to the following law of motion until time s¤,
dwL
dt
= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL;
where s¤ is the time at which the path hits some point (w¤
L;w¤
H) on the boundary. Then
starting from s¤, the principal implements (w¤
L;w¤
H) using the contracts discussed previ-
ously.
Second, I will show that any point below the lower boundary can not be implemented
by any contract. The proof for points above the upper boundary is analogous.
Let function g : [xL; ¹ u=r] 7! [xH; ¹ u=r] be the lower boundary of W. Pick a point
(wL;wH) with wH < g(wL), and a contract C. I will prove that the continuation utility
will eventually be impossible to implement under the history of reporting type L for a
long time. To see this, let us calculate the distance between the lower boundary and the




= (¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸wH(h;t) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µLv(yt(h;t;L));
dwH(h;t)
dt
· (¸ + r)wH(h;t) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡ u(ct(h;t;L)) + µHv(yt(h;t;L)):















v(y) = ¯ v/2
v(y) = ¯ v
v(y) = 0
v(y) = ¯ v/2
v(y) = ¯ v
Figure 2: Law of motion on the lower and upper boundaries.






((¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸wH(h;t) ¡
u(ct(h;t;L)) + µLv(yt(h;t;L))) ¡





((¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸wH(h;t) ¡ ¹ u + µL¹ v) ¡




µL)(¹ v ¡ v(yt)) +
18dg(wL(h;t))
dwL











((¸ + r)wL(h;t) ¡ ¸g(wL(h;t)) ¡ ¹ u + µL¹ v) ¡
((¸ + r)wH(h;t) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡ ¹ u + µH¹ v)
= ((¸ + r)g(wL(h;t)) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡ ¹ u + µH¹ v) ¡
((¸ + r)wH(h;t) ¡ ¸wL(h;t) ¡ ¹ u + µH¹ v)
= (¸ + r)(g(wL(h;t)) ¡ wH(h;t)):
Therefore, the distance is increasing exponentially and in ¯nite time, wH(h;t) will be
less than xH. This is a contradiction because the worst scenario for the H type agent is
\consumption 0 and maximal output ¹ y", which provides utility xH.
5. Dynamics of the Optimal Contract
In the last section, I characterized the set of all implementable utility pairs. Now I
study the optimal I.C. contract to implement each (wL;wH) 2 W. Lemma 1 gives some
elementary properties of the value functions.
Lemma 1 Value functions VL;VH have the following properties.
(1) VL(xL;xH) = VH(xL;xH) = ¡¹ y=r;VL(¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) = VH(¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) = ¹ c=r:
(2) VL;VH are convex.
19(3) If wL > xL;wH > xH, then5
VLwL(wL ¡ xL) + VLwH(wH ¡ xH) > 0;
VHwL(wL ¡ xL) + VHwH(wH ¡ xH) > 0:
(4) VLwH · 0;VLwL > 0;VHwL · 0;VHwH > 0:
(5) VLwLwH · 0;VHwLwH · 0:
Part (4) in the above lemma says that value functions are monotonic, increasing in the
promised utility but decreasing in the threat utility. The monotonicity in the promised
utility is straightforward because the principal needs to give more consumption(and less
output) if she promises more utility to the agent. The intuition for VLwH · 0 is as follows.
Think of wH as the threat utility that the principal imposes on the cheater. Imposing
harsher punishment necessarily puts more restrictions on the contracting problem and
thus increases the cost.
For any wL 2 [xL; ¹ u=r], let g(wL);h(wL) denote the lower and upper boundary of W,
respectively.
Lemma 2 For any wL 2 (xL; ¹ u=r);
(1) VLwH(wL;g(wL)) < 0.
(2) VHwL(wL;h(wL)) = ¡1.
(3) VLwH(wL;h(wL)) = 0;VHwL(wL;g(wL)) = 0.









@wH@wH , respectively. Similar notations are used for VH.
20Based on Lemma 2, I can de¯ne two curves fL;fH,
fL(wL) = minfwH : VLwH(wL;wH) = 0;(wL;wH) 2 Wg;
fH(wH) = minfwL : VHwL(wL;wH) = 0;(wL;wH) 2 Wg:
Since VLwHwH ¸ 0;VLwLwH · 0;VHwLwL ¸ 0;VHwLwH · 0, it is easy to see that these
curves are increasing. I will call these curves the e±ciency curves, because for each level
of the promised utility, they indicate the optimal level of the threat utility to minimize
the cost. For example, if initially the principal holds belief pL = 1 and wants to deliver
utility wL to the agent, the optimal contract for the principal is to start with (wL;fL(wL)).
These curves are also critical for our study of the dynamics, because starting from certain
initial conditions, the state variable will jump onto the e±ciency curves under the optimal
contract.












If limt#0 wH(0;L;t) > fL(wL), then the contracts starting from (wL;wH) and (wL;fL(wL))
are not equal to each other almost surely. Convex combination can be used to lower the
cost. Thus limt#0 wH(0;L;t) = fL(wL).
21Now it is ready to lay out the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB) equations that value
functions satisfy. For any (wL;wH) with wH · fL(wL), VL satis¯es
(¸ + r)VL(wL;wH) = min
c
fc ¡ (VLwL + VLwH)u(c)g + min
y
f¡y + (µLVLwL + µHVLwH)v(y)g
+¸VH(wL;wH) + VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH)
+min
¹¸0
fVLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ ¹)g:
Similarly, for (wL;wH) with wL · fH(wH),
(¸ + r)VH(wL;wH) = min
c
fc ¡ (VHwL + VHwH)u(c)g + min
y
f¡y + (µLVHwL + µHVHwH)v(y)g
+¸VL(wL;wH) + min
¹¸0
fVHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ ¹)g
+VHwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL):
In addition, notice that ¹ can be non-zero only if VLwH = 0 or VHwL = 0. Therefore, if
wH < fL(wL), I can rewrite the HJB equation as
(¸ + r)VL(wL;wH) = min
c
fc ¡ (VLwL + VLwH)u(c)g + min
y
f¡y + (µLVLwL + µHVLwH)v(y)g
+¸VH(wL;wH) + VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH)
+VLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL): (16)
Totally di®erentiating (16) with respect to wL;wH, I obtain
0 = VLwLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y)) +
VLwLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y)) + ¸VHwL ¡ ¸VLwH;
0 = VLwHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y)) +
VLwHwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y)) + ¸VHwH ¡ ¸VLwL:
The above equations together with dwL = ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y))dt, dwH =




= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y)
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y)
dVLwL
dt
= ¸VLwH ¡ ¸VHwL
dVLwH
dt
= ¸VLwL ¡ ¸VHwH:
Similarly, the ODE system under report H is
dwL
dt
= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y)
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y)
dVHwL
dt
= ¸VHwH ¡ ¸VLwL
dVHwH
dt
= ¸VHwL ¡ ¸VLwH:
Lemma 4 For wL 2 (xL; ¹ u=r);wH 2 (xH; ¹ u=r),
VLwL(wL;fL(wL)) · VHwH(wL;fL(wL));
VLwL(fH(wH);wH) ¸ VHwH(fH(wH);wH):






















Figure 3: Dynamics under report L.
















Figure 4: Dynamics under report H.
24Lemma 7 Under report L, time paths starting from fL will remain on fL(see Figure 3)
and move toward (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r). Under report H, time paths starting from fH will move above
fH(see Figure 4).
Proof. VLwL = VHwH on fL implies that VLwL > VHwH below fL. Under report L and
starting from fL, the time path will not leave fL, because if it moves below fL, VLwH
will be positive along the time path, which is a contradiction to the fact that VLwH · 0.
Furthermore, we know that
dwL
dt
= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸fL(wL) ¡ u(c) + µLv(y) > 0:
Otherwise
dwL
dt · 0 implies
dVLwL
dt · 0, which is a contradiction to
dVLwL
dt
= ¸(VLwH ¡ VHwL) > 0:
Under report H and starting from the curve fH, since
dVHwL
dt
= ¸(VHwH ¡ VLwL) < 0;
we know that the time path will leave fH and move above fH.
Intuitively, as long as the agent claims that her type is H and productivity is low, the
contract speci¯es low level of output, but in order to prevent a high productivity agent from
lying, it necessarily lowers the promised utility of a potential liar. On one hand, this keeps
incentive-compatibility, on the other hand, maintaining a low threat incurs additional cost
besides that of providing promised utility to the truth-teller.
The dynamics of the time path under high report also implies that the optimal con-
tract under commitment is no longer renegotiation-proof in the environment with persis-
tent shocks. To see this, suppose the contract starts from the curve fH, and the agent
experiences a period of high shocks, then the time path moves to the left of fH, which is
25wL < fH(wH) and VH(wL;wH) > VH(fH(wH);wH). Should the principal had the chance
to renegotiate with the agent, she would be willing to move the state from (wL;wH) to
(fH(wH);wH), and doing this makes the agent indi®erent, and lowers the principal's cost.
However it violates the ex-ante incentive constraints that prevent the type L agent from
lying.
In order to further investigate the dynamics of the optimal contract, I need to make
certain assumptions about patterns of the dynamics. These patterns are what I observe in
my numerical approximations, but at this moment I am not able to provide mathematical
proofs for them.
Assumption 1 Under report H, time paths move southwest.
Assumption 2 On fL, VHwL is monotonic.
Lemma 8 Under report H, each time path will converge to (xL;xH). On each time path,
lim
(wL;wH)!(xL;xH)
[VHwL + VHwH] · 0;
lim
(wL;wH)!(xL;xH)
[µLVHwL + µHVHwH] = 0:
Lemma 9 The region between the upper boundary and fL is absorbing. More precisely,
starting from fL, under report H, (wL;wH) enters the interior of the region.
The dynamics under the L report is relatively simple. All the points (wL;wH) approach
fL, and remain on the curve once they reach fL. So our focus is on the dynamics under
the H report.




= (¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y)
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y)
dVHwL
dt




where c 2 argmincfc¡(VHwL+VHwH)u(c)g, y 2 argminyf(µLVHwL+µHVHwH)v(y)¡yg.




(3) (Immiserization) Each time path in Part (2) will hit (xL;xH) in ¯nite time. However,
although the time path under report L moves toward (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) along the curve fL,
it never reaches (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) in ¯nite time. Asymptotically, all the time paths will be
absorbed into (xL;xH) and remain there forever.
Proof.
(1) Notice that in the region between upper boundary and fL,
VLwH(wL;wH) = 0;VLwL(wL;wH) = VLwL(wL;fL(wL)):






Then we can locally linearize the dynamic system. Since the system converges to the
point (xL;xH;0;0) in R4, any point (wL;wH;VHwL;VHwH) on the time path is on the
27stable manifold of the linear system. Continuity implies that (VHwL;VHwH) is close to
(0;0), when (wL;wH) is close to (xL;xH). However, we know that at points close to
the upper boundary, (VHwL;VHwH) is close to ¡1 and +1 respectively. Therefore,
it is a contradiction.
(3) First recall
dVHwH
dt = ¸VHwL. If lim(wL;wH)!(xL;xH) VHwL < 0, the time path has to
meet (xL;xH) in ¯nite time, otherwise, VHwH will decrease below 0 in ¯nite time,
which is contradiction to the non-negativity of VHwH. Now I show that under the L










Therefore, by Gronwall's inequality, in ¯nite time, VHwH remains ¯nite. This means
that (wL;wH) can not be (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) in ¯nite time.
6. Parameterization
In this section, I numerically solve the model with hidden productivity shocks. First
I choose the parameters so that they match observed empirical facts. Then I arti¯cially
change the productivity process to the one with i.i.d. shocks, and keep all the other
elements of the model ¯xed. I shall make comparisons between the implications of the
persistent-shock model and the i.i.d.-shock model.




















where ct and lt are consumption and labor supply respectively. When the agent with











yt is observable, while the productivity Át and labor lt are the agent's private information.






















I set r to 0:0408 to match an annual discount factor of 0:96. I follow Albanesi and Sleet[2] in
setting ¾;· to be 1:461 and 1:1840 respectively, and follow Chari, Kehoe and Mcgrattan[5]
in setting ° to be 2. This implies that the elasticity of labor supply is 0:5. The lower
bound U = ¡79:6110 is set in a way similar to that in Albanesi and Sleet[2]. I choose
parameter values for ÁL;ÁH;¸ to match the unconditional mean, unconditional variance
and the covariance of the skill process described in Golosov and Tsyvinski[9]. This implies
a value for ¸ to be 0:0249. The productivity process is highly persistent, which is the
driving force of the pattern of wedges shown below. All parameter values are listed in
Table 1.
296.1 The Wedges
I ¯rst de¯ne several wedges discussed in Albanesi and Sleet[2].





This measures the consumption smoothing implied by the optimal contract. The
larger the wedge, the worse the insurance.
(2) the consumption-leisure wedge: For a type i(i = L;H) agent with history ht¡




This measures the ratio of marginal utility to marginal disutility for the type i agent
at time t.
(3) the intertemporal wedge: For a type i(i = L;H) agent with history ht¡ at t,




The expectation is over the uncertain types of the agent at t + 1. Golosov, Kocher-
lakota and Tsyvinski[8] showed that this wedge is positive when the state variable
(wL(h;t);wH(h;t)) is above the lower bound U.
The wedges de¯ned above measure the degree of insurance from di®erent dimensions. It
is easy to see that in the optimal allocation without information frictions, all the wedges
should be 0.
30Persistent I.I.D.
Insurance wedge (0.5851, 0.3497) (0:0171;0:0151)
C-L wedge (0.2689, -0.00015) (0:00744;0)
Intertemporal wedge (0.000107, 0.0032) (¡0:0000723;0:000356)
Table 2: Wedges
6.2 Numerical Results
I follow the same procedure for the persistent-shock model and the i.i.d.-shock model.
I ¯rst solve the contracting problem and derive the optimal policy function cit(wL;wH),
yit(wL;wH), i = L;H. Then I simulate the model and compute the stationary distribu-
tion of promised utilities for each type. I calculate the three wedges for each type with
di®erent levels of promised utilities, and report the average of the wedges in the stationary
distribution in Table 2.
A striking feature of the results from the i.i.d. shock model is that all the wedges are
close to 0. This implies that the allocation under the i.i.d. shocks is close to the ¯rst-best
allocation. The intuition for the results is as follows. Given that the discount factor e¡r
is close to 1, the agent cares about her utility as the long-run average. If the shocks are
i.i.d. and thus transitory, the e®ect of any productivity shock at t is small and will be
smoothed into many periods in the future. If the agent has a bad shock, the principal will
still provide the consumption level close to that of the high-productivity agent, but will
lower the discounted utility from t + 1 on. In the long run(by law of large numbers), the
e®ects of high and low productivity shocks cancel out, and the agent does not experience
large deviations from the ¯rst-best allocation. The intertemporal taxation and subsidy
play an essential role in the optimal contract to smooth consumption.
31The patterns of wedges with persistent shocks are signi¯cantly di®erent from the i.i.d.
model. We see that the insurance wedge is more than 10 times bigger than the wedge
in i.i.d case, implying that the consumption smoothing is far from being perfect. The
consumption-leisure wedge is also quantitatively large, meaning that the low-productivity
agent is distorted in her labor-consumption decision. Despite this, the persistent shock
model does not imply a large intertemporal wedge. In order to understand these patterns,
it would be helpful to consider the permanent-shock model, which is the opposite extreme
of the i.i.d. shocks. Suppose that initially the agent has a permanent productivity shock
that is only privately observed. Then the optimal allocation is to specify a type-speci¯c
but constant stream of consumption and output for each type. It is well known that the
optimal allocation implies distortion for the low productivity agent. And intertemporal
wedge is 0 simply because that the consumption process is constant. Our results show
that the pattern of wedges with persistent shocks is similar to a permanent-shock model.
Quantitatively, this is driven by the low value of ¸. The productivity process is so persistent
that it is almost permanent.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I develop continuous-time methods for solving repeated principal-agent
problem with persistent shocks. I ¯rst simplify the incentive constraints in the discrete
time model into a system of di®erential equations and then use the di®erential equations to
infer the qualitative and quantitative properties of the optimal contract. My main result
is that the optimal contract still implies immiserization, but di®erent from the i.i.d. case,
the contract is no longer renegotiation-proof. I demonstrate my method in the context of
dynamic taxation, but the same technique is applicable to a large variety of problems with
asymmetric information.
32My numerical results from a calibrated version of the model imply that the high per-
sistence of the hidden information has signi¯cant e®ects on the properties of the optimal
contract. In the context of taxation, high persistence of productivity shocks implies much
larger distortion than i.i.d. shocks.
I conclude by brie°y mentioning one important direction for future research. I have
assumed that the agent's type can take only two values. I would like to extend the method
to any ¯nite number of types. Making this extension will leave us more freedom when we
approximate a stochastic process with ¯nite states, thus it would be necessary before we
do a more careful quantitative work. With more than two types, the di®erential equations
I derived before are still available, but the exact dynamics of the optimal contract are hard
to analyze. Future research should explore these questions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
I only give a proof for VL, since the proof for VH is the same.
(1) In order to implement (xL;xH), the principal uses the contract in which the agent
does not consume anything and produces ¹ y under all possible reports. This is clearly
the contract that minimizes cost. In order to implement (¹ u=r; ¹ u=r), the principal has
to specify consumption ¹ c and output 0 almost surely, therefore the cost is ¹ c=r.
(2) This follows from the fact that the contracting problem has a linear objective func-































This contract will be I.C.
(3) Since VL is a convex function,
VLwL(wL ¡ xL) + VLwH(wH ¡ xH) ¸ VL(wL;wH) ¡ VL(xL;xH) > 0:
(4) I show VLwH · 0 ¯rst. Pick (wL;wH);(wL;w0
H) with wH < w0
H: Let C be the optimal
contract implementing (wL;wH), and let wi(0;j) be the continuation utility of the
type i agent after she reports to be type j at time 0.
wL = wL(0;L) ¸ wL(0;H);
wH = wH(0;H) ¸ wH(0;L):
I shall design a new contract C 0 to implement (wL;w0
H), but with the same cost as C.
First recall that I can always implement (wL;w0
H) by some simple contract in which I
use (ct = 0;yt = 0) initially, and follow the contract on boundaries starting from the
time s¤ when the continuation utility hits the boundary. Notice that this contract
does not depend on the report, but only on time. I denote this simple contract by











(ct(ht);yt(ht)); if ht(0) = L;
(^ ct(ht); ^ yt(ht)); if ht(0) = H:
Under contract C 0,
wL = wL(0;L) = wL(0;H);
w
0
H = wH(0;H) ¸ wH(0;L):
34Thus C 0 is I.C. Notice that with truth-telling, and under belief pL = 1, C 0 equals C
almost surely, therefore they have the same cost.





(5) It is equivalent to show that, for (wL;wH), and h > 0,
VL(wL;wH) + VL(wL + h;wH + h) · VL(wL;wH + h) + VL(wL + h;wH):
We only need to prove these facts for the value functions in the discrete-time model,
since the value functions in discrete-time will converge to VL;VH and these properties
still hold after we take the limit. In discrete-time model, the value function is the












H ) has the above property, we
will show that (V t
L;V t
H) also has the property. To see this, let (c12
t ;y12
t ) and (c21
t ;y21
t )
be the optimal policy at (wL;wH + h) and (wL + h;wH) respectively. Then
V
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L12 = wL + dt((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸(wH + h) ¡ u(c
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H12 = (wH + h) + dt((¸ + r)(wH + h) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c
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L21 = (wL + h) + dt((¸ + r)(wL + h) ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c
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H21 = wH + dt((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸(wL + h) ¡ u(c
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21
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12
t ));
(wH + h) + dt((¸ + r)(wH + h) ¡ ¸(wL + h) ¡ u(c
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t ))):
Therefore, at (wL;wH) we can use policy (c12
t ;y12
t ), or (c21
t ;y21
t ), or (c12
t ;y21
t ), depend-





L(wL + h;wH + h) · V
t
L(wL;wH + h) + V
t
L(wL + h;wH):
Proof of Lemma 2
(1) Since at (wL;g(wL)), the only feasible policy function following report L is yt = ¹ y,
therefore
VL(wL;g(wL))
37= (ct ¡ ¹ y)dt + e
¡rdt[(1 ¡ ¸dt)VL(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸g(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µL¹ v)dt;
g(wL) + ((¸ + r)g(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µH¹ v)dt) +
¸dtVH(wL;g(wL))]
= VL(wL;g(wL)) + [¡(¸ + r)VL(wL;wH) +
VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸g(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µL¹ v) +
VLwH((¸ + r)g(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µH¹ v) + ¸VH(wL;g(wL))]dt:
VL(wL;g(wL) + µH²dt)
· [ct ¡ v
¡1(¹ v ¡ ²)]dt + e
¡rdt[
(1 ¡ ¸dt)VL(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸g(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µL¹ v)dt ¡ µL²dt;
g(wL) + ((¸ + r)g(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µH¹ v)dt)
+¸dtVH(wL;g(wL))]
= VL(wL;g(wL)) + [ct ¡ v
¡1(¹ v ¡ ²) ¡ (¸ + r)VL(wL;wH) +
VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸g(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µL¹ v ¡ µL²) +




VL(wL;g(wL) + µH²dt) ¡ VL(wL;g(wL))
µH²dt
·
¹ y ¡ v¡1(¹ v ¡ ²) ¡ VLwLµL²
µH²
< 0:
(2) I ¯rst show that VHwH(wL;h(wL)) = 1. At (wL;h(wL)), the only feasible policy
38function following report H is yt = 0, therefore
VH(wL;h(wL))
= ctdt + e
¡rdt[(1 ¡ ¸dt)VH(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct))dt;
h(wL) + ((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct))dt)
+¸dtVL(wL;h(wL))]
= VH(wL;h(wL)) + [ct ¡ (¸ + r)VH(wL;h(wL)) +
VHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct)) + VHwH((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡
¸wL ¡ u(ct)) + ¸VL(wL;h(wL))]dt:
VH(wL;h(wL) ¡ µH²dt)
· [ct ¡ v
¡1(²)]dt + e
¡rdt[(1 ¡ ¸dt)VH(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µL²)dt;
h(wL) + ((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct))dt) +
¸dtVL(wL;h(wL))
= VH(wL;h(wL)) + [ct ¡ v
¡1(²) ¡ (¸ + r)VH(wL;h(wL)) +














































VH(wL + dwL;h(wL) + dwH) ¡ VH(wL;h(wL))
dwL
= ¡1:




Starting from the initial state (wL;h(wL)), if B < h(wL), VL(wL;h(wL)) = VL(wL;B),
thus VLwH(wL;h(wL)) = 0. If B = h(wL), then yt maybe 0 or bigger than 0. If it
is 0, I can get a contradiction similar to the argument used in part (2). Therefore,
consider the case where yt > 0. Let ¹ be the control with which the continuation
40remains inside W.
VL(wL;h(wL))
= [ct ¡ yt]dt + e¡rdt[(1 ¡ ¸dt)VL(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt))dt;
h(wL) + ((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt) ¡ ¹)dt) +
¸dtVH(wL;h(wL))]
= VL(wL;h(wL)) + [ct ¡ yt ¡ (¸ + r)VL(wL;h(wL)) +
VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt)) +
VLwH((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt) ¡ ¹) + ¸VH(wL;h(wL))]dt:
VL(wL;h(wL) ¡ ¹dt)
· [ct ¡ yt]dt + e¡rdt[(1 ¡ ¸dt)VL(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt))dt;
h(wL) + ((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt) ¡ ¹)dt) + ¸dtVH(wL;h(wL))]
= VL(wL;h(wL)) + [ct ¡ yt ¡ (¸ + r)VL(wL;h(wL)) +
VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸h(wL) ¡ u(ct) + µLv(yt)) +
VLwH((¸ + r)h(wL) ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(ct) + µHv(yt) ¡ ¹) + ¸VH(wL;h(wL))]dt:
Therefore, VLwH(wL;h(wL)) = limdt!0
VL(wL;h(wL))¡VL(wL;h(wL)¡¹dt)
¹dt ¸ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
I only prove the ¯rst inequality. First I show that for wH > fL(wL),
(¸ + r)VL(wL;wH) · min
c
fc ¡ (VLwL + VLwH)u(c)g + min
y
f¡y + (µLVLwL + µHVLwH)v(y)g
+¸VH(wL;wH) + VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH) + VLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL):
41By contradiction, suppose that the left-hand side is bigger than the right-hand side, then
VL(wL;wH) · (c ¡ y)dt + e
¡rdt((1 ¡ ¸dt)VL(wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y))dt;
wH + ((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y))dt) +
¸dtVL(wL + (wL + ((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH ¡ u(c) + µLv(y))dt;
wH + ((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y))dt)
= VL(wL;wH) + (min
c
fc ¡ (VLwL + VLwH)u(c)g +
min
y
f¡y + (µLVLwL + µHVLwH)v(y)g + ¸VH(wL;wH) +
VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH) + VLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL) ¡
(¸ + r)VL(wL;wH))dt
< VL(wL;wH):
Now I know that
0 · @[min
c
fc ¡ VLwLu(c) ¡ VLwHu(c)g
+min
y
f¡y + µLVLwLv(y) + µHVLwHv(y)g + ¸VH(wL;wH) + VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH)
+VLwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL) ¡ (¸ + r)VL(wL;wH)]=@wH
= ¸(VHwH(wL;wH)jwH=fL(wL) ¡ VLwL(wL;wH)jwH=fL(wL)):
Proof of Lemma 5
We ¯rst notice that fL(wL) ¸ f
¡1
H (wL). Fix a value of wL, we know that VLwL(wL;wH)
is an decreasing function of wH, while VHwH(wL;wH) is an increasing function. Since
VHwH(wL;fL(wL)) ¡ VLwL(wL;fL(wL)) ¸ 0;
VHwH(wL;f
¡1
H (wL)) ¡ VLwL(wL;f
¡1
H (wL)) · 0:
I obtain fL(wL) ¸ f
¡1
H (wL).





L). Then since fH is below fL by the previous arguments, fL and fH has
to be tangent at point (w¤
L;fL(w¤
L)). On curve fL, HJB equations are
(¸ + r)VL(wL;fL(wL)) = min
c
fc ¡ VLwLu(c)g + min
y
f¡y + µLVLwLv(y)g +
¸VH(wL;fL(wL)) + VLwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸fL(wL)): (19)
(¸ + r)VH(wL;fL(wL)) = min
c
fc ¡ VHwLu(c) ¡ VHwHu(c)g +
min
y
f¡y + µLVHwLv(y) + µHVHwHv(y)g +
¸VL(wL;fL(wL)) + VHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸fL(wL)) +
VHwH((¸ + r)fL(wL) ¡ ¸wL): (20)





fc ¡ VLwLu(c)g + min
y
f¡y + µLVLwLv(y)g +










f¡y + µLVHwLv(y) + µHVHwHv(y)g +
¸
¸ + r
VHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸fL(wL)) +
¸
¸ + r






















(¡u(cL) + µLv(yL)) +
dVLwL
dwL
((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸fL(wL)) +
























(2¸+r)r(u(cL) ¡ µLv(yL)) + ¸
(2¸+r)r(u(cH) ¡ µHv(yH)):
















L = u(cH) ¡ µHv(yH):





















H) uses full information, which is impossible given our informational
constraints.
44Proof of Lemma 6
I ¯rst show that VLwL = VHwH on fL. By contradiction, I assume that VLwL < VHwH on
fL. This would imply that VL(wL;wH) > VH(wL;wH) for all wH · fL(wL);(wL;wH) 2 W.
This can be seen as follows. First starting from (wL;fL(wL)), the time path under
report L moves below fL because
dVLwH
dt
= ¸(VLwL ¡ VHwH) < 0:
This means that on the time path, instead of being an inequality,
dwH
dt
= (¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL ¡ u(c) + µHv(y):
The type H agent is indi®erent between telling the truth and cheating, because reporting
L also delivers the promised utility. Now I show that when the principal's belief is pL = 0
and wants to deliver a utility pair (wL;wH), she can utilize the consumption-output plan
implied by the value function VL(wL;wH) and incurs the expected cost VL(wL;wH)(but
under the belief pL = 0, not under pL = 1 !). The only thing di®erent is that instead of
proposing truth-telling as the strategy for the agent, the contract require randomization of
the reporting strategy. Let µ1
t be a Markov process with initial state L, which is independent
with the agent's privately observed types µt. Let t1¤ be the time of µ1
t's ¯rst transition







L;if t < minft1¤;t¤g;
µt;if t ¸ minft1¤;t¤g:
Up to the time of the ¯rst transition, the agent cheats by telling her type to be L. At the
time of switch, if t1¤ < t¤, the agent report that her type switches from L to H, although
she does not have one. If t1¤ ¸ t¤, she continues to claims to be the type L type although
she has a switch from H to L in the past. After t¤, the contract requires truth-telling. This
45strategy is optimal at t < minft1¤;t¤g because when the agent's type is H, she could still
obtain the promised utility by cheating, as we argued before. It is easy to verify that if
the agent uses this strategy, the principal incurs the expected cost VL(wL;wH). Since the
above mechanism and strategy is one option for the principal when she wants to deliver
(wL;wH) under belief pL = 0,
VL(wL;wH) > VH(wL;wH);8wH · fL(wL);(wL;wH) 2 W:
Under the assumption that VLwL < VHwH on fL, it is not possible that VLwL > VHwH
on fH, because by the same argument used before, it would imply
VL(wL;wH) < VH(wL;wH);8wL · fH(wH);(wL;wH) 2 W:
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we need to get a contradiction in the case
VLwL < VHwH;on fL;
VLwL = VHwH;on fH:


















































From this contradiction, we know that VLwL = VHwH on fL. This immediately implies that
VLwL > VHwH on fH, because fH is below fL, and (VLwL ¡ VHwH) is decreasing in wH.
46Proof of Lemma 8
We show that a time path under report H can not converge to any interior point. By
contradiction, suppose a point (wL;wH) is stationary, then
dVHwL
dt
= ¸(VHwH ¡ VLwL);
dVHwH
dt
= ¸(VHwL ¡ VLwH):
VHwH ¡ VLwL = 0 implies that (wL;wH) is on fL, but then VHwL ¡ VLwH < 0.
Take a time path (wL(t);wH(t)) that converges to (xL;xH). The HJB equation is
(¸ + r)VH(wL;wH) = min
c
fc ¡ (VHwL + VHwH)u(c)g + min
y
f¡y + (µLVHwL + µHVHwH)v(y)g
+¸VL(wL;wH) + VHwL((¸ + r)wL ¡ ¸wH)
+VHwH((¸ + r)wH ¡ ¸wL):
Taking limit,
(¸ + r)(¡¹ y=r) = c
¤ ¡ y
¤ + ¸(¡¹ y=r);
where c
¤ 2 argmincfc ¡ Bu(c)g;y







which implies c¤ = 0;y¤ = ¹ y;B · 0;C = 0:
Proof of Lemma 9






































Assume by contradiction that limwL"¹ u=r VHwL(wL;fL(wL)) is ¯nite,








VL(¹ u=r; ¹ u=r) ¡ VL(¹ u=r ¡ dwL;fL(¹ u=r ¡ dwL))
dwL
:
This implies VH(wL;fL(wL)) · VL(wL;fL(wL)), a contradiction to VH(wL;fL(wL)) >
VL(wL;fL(wL)).
48Now recall the ODE system describing the dynamics under report H,
dVHwL
dt
= ¸VHwH ¡ ¸VLwL:
Therefore, on fL, the time path of (wL;wH) will be tangent to the isoquants of VHwL. Since
the isoquants go above fL, the time path of (wL;wH) must enter the interior of the region.
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